Abstract-We consider a double-auction mechanism, which was recently proposed in the context of a mobile data-offloading market. It is also applicable in a network slicing market. Network operators (users) derive benefit from offloading their traffic to third party WiFi or femtocell networks (link-suppliers). Link-suppliers experience costs for the additional capacity that they provide. Users and link-suppliers (collectively referred to as agents) have their pay-offs and cost functions as private knowledge. A system-designer decomposes the problem into a network problem (with surrogate pay-offs and surrogate cost functions) and agent problems (one per agent). The surrogate pay-offs and cost functions are modulated by the agents' bids. Agents' payoffs and costs are then determined by the allocations and prices set by the system designer. Under this design, so long as the agents do not anticipate the effect of their actions, a competitive equilibrium exists as a solution to the network and agent problems, and this equilibrium optimizes the system utility. However, this design fails when the agents are strategic (priceanticipating). The presence of strategic supplying agents drives the system to an undesirable equilibrium with zero participation resulting in an efficiency loss of 100%. This is in stark contrast to the setting when link-suppliers are not strategic: the efficiency loss is at most 34% when the users alone are strategic. The paper then proposes a Stackelberg game modification with asymmetric information structures for suppliers and users in order to alleviate the efficiency loss problem. The system designer first announces the allocation and payment functions. He then invites the supplying agents to announce their bids, following which the users are invited to respond to the suppliers' bids. The resulting Stackelberg games' efficiency losses can be characterized in terms of the suppliers' cost functions when the user pay-off functions are linear. Specifically, when the link-supplier's cost function is quadratic, the worst case efficiency loss is 25%. Further, the loss in efficiency improves for polynomial cost functions of higher degree.
network can be offloaded to already installed third-party WiFi or femtocell networks. This provides an alternative means of network expansion. Wi-Fi access-point operators and femtocell network operators will however expect compensation for allowing macrocellular network traffic through their access points. Technological, security, and preliminary economic studies for secure and seamless offloading have been discussed in [2] [3] [4] [5] .
Network slicing [6] is a virtualization technique that allows many logical networks to run atop shared physical networks. It allows physical mobile network operators to partition their network resources and offer them to different users or tenants (IoT streams, mobile broadband streams, etc.) in return for suitable compensation. It enables network operators to focus on their core strength of delivering high-quality network experiences while the tenants or virtual network operators can focus more on business, billing, and branding relations.
In the rest of the paper, we discuss double auction mechanisms in the context of mobile data offloading. But the mapping to the context of network slicing will be obvious.
In recent work, Iosifidis et al. [7] proposed a double-auction mechanism where a set of mobile network operators (buyers or users in this work) compete for resources from accesspoint operators (sellers or links in this work). The pay-offs of the users and costs of the links are private information to the respective parties. The mechanism works as follows. A network manager collects how much each network operator is willing to pay each access-point operator, scalar signals on the costs at each access point, and then determines how much traffic should be offloaded to each access point and how much each agent will pay or get. The mobile network operators and the access-point operators then comply. This is a scenario with an asymmetric information structure where (a) the broker is not aware of the actual needs and costs of network and access-point operators, (b) each operator is aware only of his own needs or costs, and (c) all agents are pricetaking (made precise in the next section). Following Kelly et al. [8] , Iosifidis et al. [7] showed that a tâtonnement procedure converges to the system optimal operating point.
Iosifidis et al. [7, p.1635 ] point out that designing incentive compatible mechanisms for double-auctions which are weakly budget balanced (the broker should not end up subsidizing the mechanism) is 'notoriously hard' and has been done only in certain simplified settings (McAfee auction [9] ) or can be computationally intensive. So [7] took a network utility maximization approach and left the analysis of the priceanticipating scenario open [7, Sec VII, p.1646].
Our contributions in this paper are as follows.
1) We first re-derive the result on efficient allocation when the agents are price-taking, mainly to set up the notation for the next three results. 2) We then analyze the price-anticipating scenario along the lines of Johari et al. [10] . When agents are priceanticipating, they recognize the effect of their bids on the allocation. The appropriate equilibrium notion is a Nash equilibrium. The situation in Johari et al. [10] , when mapped to the current offloading setting, would be one where the access-point operators are not strategic. The efficiency loss due to price-anticipating mobile offloading agents is then at most 34%. However, when the access-point agents (suppliers) are also strategic and price-anticipating, the equilibrium is one where the offloading agents prefer not to offload any traffic. The efficiency loss is then 100%. The main message is that the earlier proposed double-auction mechanism of [7] works when agents are price-taking, but fails in the more real situation when agents are price-anticipating. One must then look for alternative double-auction mechanisms. 3) We then propose a modified mechanism where the supplying agent bids first and the users bid in response. To show that the situation is now improved, we characterize the new efficiency loss in terms of the supplier's cost function, when the user pay-off functions are linear. For instance, for the quadratic link-cost function, the worst-case efficiency loss (with the worst-case taken over linear user pay-off functions) is at most 25%. 4) We extend all of the above results to the setting with multiple links.
From an implementation theory perspective, the Iosifidis et al. [7] mechanism in the price-taking scenario implements the social welfare maximization rule under the competitive equilibrium solution concept with the minimal message dimension of 1 (scalar signals). The above implementation ignores strategic behavior of individual agents. It is not possible to enforce such mechanisms in general because individual preferences may diverge from social welfare maximization. This is the price-anticipating scenario. It is anticipated that if we do not enlarge the signal space dimension there may be no mechanism, let alone the Iosifidis et al. mechanism, that can implement the social welfare maximization rule, under now the Nash equilibrium solution concept. This is why the price-anticipating scenario with non-strategic link suppliers suffered from an efficiency loss. What is surprising in our current setting is the dramatic increase in efficiency loss from at most 34% (Johari et al. [10] ) to 100% (contribution (2) of this paper). What is promising from our study is that this efficiency loss can be mitigated by structuring the interaction, by making the link player lead the interaction (contribution (3) of this paper). The solution concept is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Efficiency loss drops down to a value that depends on the supplier's cost function and is at most 25% for quadratic costs and linear user pay-offs. This of course raises the question of what is the minimal signalling dimension in the price-anticipating scenario that implements the social welfare maximization rule in the Nash equilibrium solution concept.
This a very interesting question that is beyond the scope of this work. Our proposed scheme, which structures the interactions by asking the supplier to lead, reduces efficiency loss. It would be of utmost interest if this structuring also reduces the minimum signalling dimension for social welfare maximization in the Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept. We refer the reader to [11] for an excellent discussion on the implementation theory perspective.
The paper is organized into two parts. In Part I we study a setting with a single link-supplier. Specifically, in Section II, we discuss the system model and problem definition. In Section III, we discuss the price-taking scenario for the single-link case.
In Section IV, we analyze the price-anticipating scenario. As a positive result, in Section V, we discuss our proposed mechanism and characterize the worst-case efficiency loss for linear user pay-offs in terms of the single supplying agent's cost function. In Part II (Sections VI to IX) we generalize the above results to the setting with multiple link-suppliers. To focus on the flow of key ideas, we have moved all the proofs to the Appendix. The paper concludes with some remarks in Section X.
PART I: SINGLE LINK
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
Consider a scenario where M users intend to share the bandwidth of a (single) link of capacity C > 0 owned by a link-supplier. In the context of mobile-data offloading [7] , users and link-supplier correspond to mobile-network operators and the single access-point operator (e.g., Wi-Fi, femtocell), respectively. The mobile-network operators want to buy a share of the limited bandwidth resource available at the access point to offload their macrocellular traffic, while the access point operator is interested in maximizing his profit. In the double auction terminology [9] , users are synonymous to buyers bidding for a share of a resource while the link-supplier is the seller. We refer to the users and the link-supplier collectively as agents. The social planner, the entity that designs the mechanism (i.e., sets up the rules for information transfer, allocation, and payments) is referred to as the network-manager, Let x m denote the rate requested by user m = 1, 2, · · · , M , and let y m be the rate the link-supplier is willing to allocate to user m. Thus, x = (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x M ) and y = (y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y M ) represent the rate-request and rate-allocation vectors, respectively. Let y = m y m denote the aggregaterate allocated by the link-supplier to all users. For user m, the benefit of acquiring a rate of x m is represented by a payoff function U m (x m ); we assume that U m , m = 1, 2, · · · , M , are concave, strictly increasing and continuously differentiable with finite U m (0). Similarly, the cost incurred by the linksupplier for accepting to serve an aggregate rate of y is given by V (y), where V is strictly convex, strictly increasing and continuously differentiable. Thus, the system optimal solution is the solution to the optimization problem: SYSTEM Maximize:
Subject to:
Continuity of the objective function and compactness of the constraint set imply that an optimal solution
Further, if U m are strictly concave then (since V is strictly convex) the solution is unique. Since U m are strictly increasing in x m , an optimal solution must satisfy x s = y s . Thus, at optimality, the rate-requests (demand) and the rate-allocations (supply) are matched although the capacity C may not be fully utilized.
A network-manager, however, cannot solve the formulation in (1) without the knowledge of user pay-offs and the link-cost function. Hence, consider the following mechanism proposed by Iosifidis et al. in [7] for rate allocation. Each user m submits a bid p m ≥ 0 that denotes the amount he is willing to pay, while the link-supplier communicates signals β m (m = 1, 2, · · · , M ) that implicitly indicate the amounts of bandwidth that he is willing to provide; we refer to p := (p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p M ) and β := (β 1 , β 2 , · · · , β M ) as the bids submitted by the users and the link-supplier, respectively.
The network-manager is responsible for fixing the prices µ m (m = 1, 2, · · · , M ) and λ that determines the rate allocation. The prices µ := (µ 1 , µ 2 , · · · , µ M ) and λ are supposed to be the optimal dual variables of the following network problem proposed by Iosifidis et al. in [7] : NETWORK Maximize:
In the NETWORK problem above we choose to use β instead of a related α that was used in the original formulation by Iosifidis et al. in [7] ; the quantities α and β are related by β m = 1/α m ∀m. Then each β m is R + -valued, with values on the positive real line, while each α m is in general R + ∪{+∞}-valued. Moreover, the signals in β are directly proportional to the amount of bandwidth the link-supplier is willing to share. For instance, a lower value of β m implies that the bandwidth shared by the link-supplier with user m is low, and vice versa. In particular, β m = 0 implies that the link-supplier is unwilling to share any bandwidth with user m. This will be useful while interpreting the Nash equilibrium bid-vectors (Theorem 2).
The above NETWORK problem is identical to the SYSTEM problem but with the true pay-off and cost functions replaced by surrogate pay-off and cost functions. In the following, we first review the case when the users and the link-supplier are price-taking. This means agents assume prices are given and do not anticipate the effect of their bids on the prices set by the network-manager. See Definition 1 below of a competitive equilibrium. We then proceed to study the more-involved price-anticipating scenario. Here the agents recognize that the effective price is based on their bids, anticipate the resulting allocation, payment, and therefore their pay-off, and act accordingly. The resulting pay-off functions are new functions of the bids; see Definition 2. Our methodology in Sections III and IV is similar to Johari et al. [10] , but the outcome in the price-anticipating scenario is dramatically negative due to the presence of the strategic link-supplier, as we will soon see. We then propose a remedy via a Stackelberg framework where the link-supplier is a lead player and the users are followers.
III. PRICE-TAKING SCENARIO
The sequence of exchanges (between the network-manager and the agents) in the price-taking scenario is as shown in the box describing the price-taking mechanism (PTM) below.
PRICE-TAKING MECHANISM (PTM)
1) The network manager announces to the agents how the allocation will be done and the payments will be fixed, as a function of prices and agents' bids.
2) The network-manager then initiates the bidding process by fixing the prices (µ, λ).
3) The agents accept the prices and respond by announcing their respective bids, p and β. The prices set by the network-manager are (µ, λ). The payoff to user m, for bidding p m , is given by
Similarly, the pay-off to the link-supplier is given by
Using the above pay-off functions we characterize the solution as a competitive equilibrium which is defined as follows (unless mentioned otherwise, we assume that the agents' bids and the link-supplier's prices are non-negative, i.e., p m , β m , µ m , λ ≥ 0 ∀m; also, we use 0 to denote the vector of all-zeros of appropriate length):
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium [10] , [12] ): We say that (p, β, λ, µ) constitutes a competitive equilibrium if the following conditions hold:
Then, the following should hold:
(C3-b) For all m ∈ M, the equality µ m = µ holds, where
(C3-c) Furthermore,
In the above definition, condition (C1) implies that the users do not benefit by deviating from their equilibrium bids p m , when the prices (λ, µ) set by the network-manager are fixed. Similarly, (C2) implies that the link-supplier has no benefit in deviating from the equilibrium bid-vector β. Although (C1) and (C2) result in the optimality of the users' and the link-supplier's problem of maximizing their respective payoffs, these conditions by themselves do not guarantee systemoptimal performance. The conditions in (C3) (essentially derived from the optimality conditions for NETWORK) are crucial to guarantee that the prices (λ, µ) set by the networkmanager are dual optimal for SYSTEM. Condition (C3) along with (C1) and (C2) can then be used to show the optimality of a competitive equilibrium. We summarize this result in the following theorem; in particular, we first prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium, and then derive its optimality property. This theorem is essentially an extension of the result due to Kelly [13] and Kelly et al. [8] (see also [10] and [12] ). The main difference that warrants an extension is the presence of the link-supplier as a strategic agent.
Theorem 1: When the agents are price-taking, there exists a competitive equilibrium, i.e., there exist vectors (p, β, λ, µ) satisfying (C1), (C2) and (C3). Moreover, given a competitive equilibrium (p, β, λ, µ), the rate vectors x and y defined as x m = p m /µ m and y m = β m (µ m − λ) (∀m) are optimal for the problem SYSTEM in (1).
Proof: The result can be gleaned from the results in [7] though it is not explicitly stated. Our proof of Theorem 1 is a direct one that does not rely on any learning dynamics. Instead, it is based on Lagrangian techniques. Details are available in Appendix A.
IV. PRICE-ANTICIPATING SCENARIO
In contrast to the price-taking scenario, agents initiate the bidding process in the price-anticipating scenario. Specifically, the sequence of exchanges is as given below.
PRICE-ANTICIPATING MECHANISM (PAM)
1) The network manager first announces to the agents how the allocation will be done and the payments will be fixed, as a function of prices and agents' bids. 2) Agents then initiate the bidding process by simultaneously announcing their bids, denoted p and β.
3) The network-manager sets prices (µ(p, β), λ(p, β)) where we have set µ(p, β) = (µ 1 (p, β), · · · , µ M (p, β)). Note that the above prices are dual optimal for the NETWORK problem in (2). 4) The payments and the allocated rates are exactly as in the price-taking mechanism, but with (µ, λ) replaced by (µ(p, β), λ(p, β)).
In the following lemma we report the expression for the prices (λ(p, β), µ(p, β)).
Lemma 1: Given any vector (p, β) of users' and linksupplier's bids, the prices (λ(p, β), µ(p, β)) set by the network-manager are given by
where f −1 p,β is the inverse of f p,β defined as
and
Proof: See Appendix B-A. Continuing with the discussion, using the above prices in (3), the pay-offs to the users in the price-anticipating scenario can be expressed as follows for m = 1, 2, · · · , M (for simplicity, we use λ := λ(p, β)):
where
denotes the bids of all users other than m, while β is the bid submitted by the link-supplier. Similarly, for the link-supplier we have
The quantity V (C) in the above expression is due to complementary slackness conditions which imply
The users and the link-supplier recognize that their bids affect the prices and the allocation. Acting as rational and strategic agents, they now anticipate these prices. The appropriate notion of an equilibrium in this context is the following.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium): A bid vector (p, β) is a Nash equilibrium if, for all m = 1, 2, · · · , M , we have
the link is not fully utilized. In this case the Lagrange multiplier λ = λ(p, β) = 0. Examination of (12) and (13) indicates that the payments made by the users are all passed on to the link-supplier. This may be interpreted as follows: for a given set of payments, the link-supplier bids are such that the link is viewed as a costly resource and the network-manager passes on all his revenue to the link-supplier. The link-supplier is thus assured of this revenue even if his link is not fully utilized. If, on the other hand, the link-supplier's bids are such that i √ p i β i > C, then λ > 0, and it is clear from (13) that not all the collected revenue is passed on to the link-supplier. Indeed, since λ > 0, we have Thus, in the price-anticipating setting, efficiency loss is 100%, which we interpret as a market break-down. Indeed, at β o = 0, the link-supplier is assured an income of m p m . Given this guaranteed income, he minimizes his cost by supplying zero capacity. The resulting equilibrium is one with the lowest efficiency, and the situation is vastly different from the setting when the link-supplier is not viewed as an agent [10] .
V. PRICE-ANTICIPATION WITH LINK AS LEAD PLAYER
In view of the break-down of the market when both the users and the link-supplier are simultaneously price anticipating, we design an alternative scheme that involves an additional stage. The sequence of exchanges is as follows.
PRICE-ANTICIPATION WITH LINK AS LEADER (PALL)
1) The network manager first announces to the agents how the allocation will be done and the payments will be fixed, as a function of prices and agents' bids.
2) The link-supplier then announces his bid-vector β. This information is made available to all users.
3) The users then send their bids p
The network-manager then computes the prices (µ(p β , β), λ(p β , β)) by solving the NET-WORK problem in (2). 5) The payments and the rates-allocated are exactly as in the price-taking mechanism, but with (µ, λ)
The analysis of this mechanism proceeds as follows. Given a (β, p), the expression for the prices set by the networkmanager are as in Lemma 1. As a result, the expressions for the users' and the link-supplier's pay-off functions are exactly as in (12) and (13), respectively, but with p replaced by p β . Using these pay-off functions, we characterize the solution in the form of Stackelberg equilibrium defined next.
Observe that the bid-vector β announced by the linksupplier in step-2 anticipates the user bids p β of step-3. For a given β, the bids submitted by the users is in anticipation of the prices the network-manager announces in step-4.
For the ease of exposition, we assume that C = ∞ so that the capacity constraint is not binding (the case where C is finite can be similarly handled). Thus, recalling (9) and (11), we have λ(p, β) = 0 and µ m (p, β) = pm βm . As a result the pay-off functions can be simply expressed as
This simplification will enable us to focus on the key ideas rather than dwell on the technicalities arising from a finite C (which can be handled but is cumbersome and not enlightening).
From (14) we see that the user pay-offs are independent of the bids submitted by the other users. As a result, for a given β, the unique equilibrium strategy for user-m is given by
In Lemma 2 we report the expression for p β m that is obtained by solving (16) .
Lemma 2: For a given β we have
where r βm is the fixed point of U m (r) = 2r/β m . Proof: Since the objective function in (16) is continuously differentiable and strictly concave (both are easy to check), it suffices to show that p β m of (17) solves the following optimality equation:
Indeed, with p m = p β m of (17) plugged into the above expression we have
and so r βm satisfies U m (r βm ) = 2r βm /β m . The case when β m = 0 is straightforward. We extend the definition of r βm in the above lemma by defining r βm = 0 if β m = 0. It is then easy to see that r βm = p β m β m is the allocation to user m. Plugging the above result into (15), we compute the optimal β that the link-supplier should announce in step-1 as
where β ≥ 0 means component-wise inequality. For any β * ∈ B * it is clear that (β * , p . However, we first need to assert the existence of a solution β * , i.e., that the set B * is nonempty. Theorem 3: Suppose U m (·) and V (·) satisfy the following: xU m (x) → ∞ and V (x)/x → ∞ as x → ∞. Then the set B * is nonempty. Hence, under the above assumptions on the pay-offs and cost function, a Stackelberg equilibrium exists.
Proof: See Appendix C. Remark: The above assumption excludes cost functions that are asymptotically linear, and pay-offs such as log(1 + x). However, we note that these assumptions are not too restrictive. Also, note that it is not possible to assert the uniqueness of β * as it is not clear how r 2 βm /β m varies as a function of β m (although it can be shown that r βm increases with β m ).
In the remainder of this section, we restrict attention to linear user pay-offs. 
Substituting for r βm in (18), the optimal β * can be computed by solving
The solution to the above problem is given by
where v(x) = V (x). The equilibrium bids of users in response to this optimized β * is then given by
Thus, when the user pay-offs are linear, the link-supplier allocates all the bandwidth to the "best" user (i.e., the one with the maximum slope c m ); in return, the best user alone makes a positive payment to the link-supplier. The rate allocated to user m at equilibrium is
The total rate served by the link-supplier at equilibrium is given by m y
2 .
B. Lower Bound on Efficiency for Linear User Pay-offs
Given a Stackelberg equilibrium (β * , p β * ) the efficiency is defined as the ratio of the utility at equilibrium (Stackelberg utility) to the system optimum (social utility):
where x s m denotes the social optimum allocation to user m (obtained by solving SYSTEM in (1)). Note that we have emphasized the dependency of efficiency on ({U m }; V ) by incorporating these into the notation for efficiency.
When the link-supplier is non-strategic, from Johari et al. [10] it is known that the bound on efficiency is (4 √ 2−5), i.e., E({U m }, V ) ≥ (4 √ 2 − 5) for any general collection of user pay-off functions {U m } (the loss in efficiency is thus no more than 34%). The above bound is obtained in [10] by doing the following. (a) Show that the users' equilibrium bids in the original game (with general user pay-off functions) constitutes an equilibrium in an alternate game with appropriately chosen linear pay-off functions. In our case, although (a) holds 1 for any given β, there is a subtle issue 2 . Since the link-supplier is also strategic, the original game and the alternate game (with linear user pay-offs) may not have identical Stackelberg equilibria. In particular, the β * that optimizes the objective in (18) may not necessarily optimize
which is the objective corresponding to the game with linear pay-offs:
. Thus, (a) and (b) may not hold for general user pay-offs. However, an analog of (c) continues to hold if we restrict our attention to the ensemble of all linear user pay-offs. The lower bound on efficiency will however depend on the link-suppliers cost function V (x). This result is detailed in the following theorem.
Theorem 4: Fix a link-cost function V (·). For any set of linear user pay-offs {U m }, we have
where v(·) := V (·).
Proof: See Appendix D.
1 Formally, we can show that for any given β, the equilibrium strategy p β m for the users in the original game with pay-off functions {Um} is also an equilibrium strategy for the users in an alternate game with linear pay-offs {U m}, where U m(xm) = cmxm with cm = U m (r β * m ). 2 Our conference version [1] missed this subtle point and incorrectly made a more general claim that the lower bound held for a larger class of user pay-offs.
C. Efficiency Bound for Linear User Pay-offs and Polynomial Link-Costs
We apply the above theorem to derive explicit expressions for the lower bound on the efficiency when the link-cost function is the polynomial bx n . We start with the simplest case of quadratic link-cost, i.e., V (x) = bx 2 where b > 0. We then have v(x) = 2bx so that v −1 (y) = y 2b . Thus, using (25), we obtain
Thus, when the link-cost is quadratic, the worst-case efficiency loss for any linear user pay-off is no more that 25%. Similarly, suppose V (x) = bx 3 for x ≥ 0, with b > 0. (This is increasing and convex for x ≥ 0.) Then, using the bound (25) and a similar calculation, we obtain
Thus, the worst-case efficiency loss improves to 12% when the link-cost is cubic. In general, suppose the link-cost is polynomial of degree n ≥ 2, i.e., V (x) = bx n , x ≥ 0, b > 0, then the bound on efficiency is given by
The aforementioned lower bound is increasing as a function of n and converges to 1 as n → ∞. Thus, if the link-cost can be modeled as bx n , the efficiency loss reduces with increase in n.
The above observation provides strong support for our proposed PALL mechanism when compared with the priceanticipating mechanism of Section IV whose efficiency loss (for any {U m } including linear user pay-offs and any V ) is 100%.
D. Worst-Case Bound on Efficiency for Linear User Pay-offs
Although the class of polynomial link-cost functions yield favorable lower bounds on efficiency, we now show that there exists a family of link-cost functions V n , n ≥ 1, such that the corresponding sequence of efficiency-bound converges to 0 as n → ∞. Thus, the worst-case efficiency bound, over all possible linear {U m } and over all possible V , is 0.
To see this, let us first rewrite (25) by expressing V in the integral form
For a given c and a marginal cost function for the link-supplier v(·), H(c, v) can be geometrically interpreted with the aid of the illustration in Fig.1(a) as follows: the numerator in the formula for efficiency is the area of the region A 1 (light shaded region) while the denominator is total area of A 1 and A 2 (shaded dark). We then have
where A i denotes the area of region A i (i = 1, 2). In Fig. 1(a) we have used e 1 to denote
where d 1 is arbitrarily chosen in c 2 , c . Since V is strictly convex and increasing, it follows that v is strictly increasing. Now, it is possible to construct a sequence of v(·) functions, say {v n }, such that e n ↓ 0, d n ↓ c 2 while f n ↑ v −1 (c); an illustration of such a construction is depicted in Fig. 1(b) .
Observe that along such a sequence we have A 1 ↓ 0 and A 2 ↑ c 2 v −1 (c) > 0. As a result we have H(c, v n ) → 0 as n → ∞. Thus, for any given c it is possible to produce pathological link-cost functions whose efficiency-bounds are arbitrarily close to 0. Therefore, it is not possible to guarantee a less-than-100% efficiency loss (i.e., a positive efficiency) when the class of all possible link-cost functions are considered. Nevertheless, bounding the efficiency for a fixed link-cost function is reassuring.
PART II: MULTIPLE LINKS VI. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DEFINITION In this section we extend our results to the more general setting with multiple links. We assume an example scenario with parallel links so that the users have the flexibility to offload different amounts of rates on different links. Simultaneously, the respective link-managers have to be competitive in terms of their bids in order to maximize their respective payoffs 3 . Although it is natural to expect active participation from both users and link-managers, in the upcoming Theorem 6 we show the contrary. We will see that, when the users and the link-managers are strategic, the market collapses due to zero participation from both types of agents. This outcome is similar to the single-link case. This also establishes that the break-down in the single-link case is not due to the monopolistic nature of the supplier in the single-link setting. In Theorem 6, alternative routes exist, and yet, the undesirable equilibrium ensues. We begin by generalizing our notation from Section II. As before we assume that there are M users in the system. However, we now generalize our earlier model by introducing L parallel links. The capacity of link = 1, 2, · · · , L is given by C > 0. Let x m denote the rate requested by user m on link , and let y m be the rate the link-manager is willing to allocate to user m. Thus, x m = (x m1 , x m2 , · · · , x mL ) is the rate-request vector of user m, and y = (y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y M ) is the rate-allocation vector of link . Let X = (x m : m = 1, 2, · · · , M ) and Y = (y : = 1, 2, · · · , L) denote the raterequest matrix and rate-allocation matrix, respectively. The user pay-off and the link-cost functions are given by U m and V . As before, we assume that U m and V are concave and strictly convex, respectively. In addition, both U m and V are strictly increasing and continuously differentiable with U m (0) finite.
The analog of the problem SYSTEM in (1) is given by (in the sequel, the acronym ML stands for Multi-Link):
ML-SYSTEM Maximize:
Similarly, denoting the users' and the link-managers' bidvectors as
respectively, the analog of problem NETWORK in (2) is:
We introduce some more notation. Let P = (p m : m = 1, 2, · · · , M ) denote the users' bid matrix. Similarly, the link-managers' bid matrix is denoted by B = (β : = 1, 2, · · · , L). The network-manager sets prices λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 , · · · , λ L ) and M = (µ m : m = 1, 2, · · · , M ) where µ m = (µ m1 , µ m2 , · · · , µ mL ). The prices λ and M are essentially the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (28b) and (28c), respectively.
We investigate the price-taking and the price-anticipating scenarios separately, as was done in the single-link setting.
VII. PRICE-TAKING SCENARIO
The mechanism under the price-taking scenario is exactly as in Section III (see PTM in Section III), except that now there are multiple link-managers who submit their respective bids β ( = 1, 2, · · · , L) simultaneously. In this setting, given the prices (λ, M) set by the network-manager, the pay-off to user m can be written as
Similarly, the pay-off to the link-manager is given by
The following are the generalizations of Definition 1 and Theorem 1, respectively. Definition 4 (Competitive Equilibrium): A vector of bids and prices (P , B, λ, M) is said to constitute a competitive equilibrium if the following conditions hold:
Theorem 5: When the users and the link-managers are price-taking, there exists a competitive equilibrium. Moreover, given a competitive equilibrium (P, B, λ, M), the rate matrices X and Y, defined as x m = p m /µ m and y m = β m µ m − λ ∀(m, ), are optimal for the problem ML-SYSTEM in (27).
Proof: The proof is omitted since it is a straightforward extension of the proof of Theorem 1.
VIII. PRICE-ANTICIPATING SCENARIO
Recall that when the users and the link-managers are priceanticipating they expect that the bids submitted by them affect the prices set by the network-manager. In particular, the users and the link-managers are aware that the prices (λ(P, B), M(P, B)) set by the network-manager, in response to the bids (P,B) submitted by the agents, are dual-optimal for the problem ML-NETWORK in (28). The details of the mechanism under price-anticipating scenario is similar to PAM in Section IV, except that the setting now consists of multiple link-managers who submit their respective bids simultaneously. Now, the expressions for the prices set by the networkmanager is as reported in the following lemma (which is inline with the result in Lemma 1).
Lemma 3: Given any matrix (P, B) of users' and linkmanagers' bids, the prices (λ (P, B), M(P, B) ) set by the network-manager are given by, ∀( , m)
where f −1 denotes the inverse of the function f which is defined as
.
Proof: Omitted since it is a straightforward extension of the proof of Lemma 1.
The pay-off to the users in the price-anticipating scenario can thus be expressed as
It is possible to simplify the above expression by substituting for µ m (P, B). We then obtain an expression that is a generalization of the pay-off function in (12) (note that Q m (·) in (12) is for L = 1). However, we now need to consider 2 L sub-cases depending on whether i √ p i β i ≤ C or otherwise, for each
Then, denoting λ 2 := λ 2 (P, A), we have
The expression for the links' pay-off function, however, comprises only two sub-cases as in (13):
where λ := λ (A, P). Using the above pay-off functions, the definition of Nash equilibrium in Definition 2 can be analogously extended to bid vectors (P, B) in the multiplelink setting.
Finally, in the following theorem we report the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (P o , B o ), which is inefficient in the sense that the market is non-functional at (P o , B o ) with users making zero payments (i.e., p m = 0) and the link-managers providing zero rate (i.e., β m = 0). 
where B = [β β − ] is the bid matrix that results when link unilaterally deviates from β to β . Again, as in Section V, for simplicity we relax the capacity constraint by assuming that C = ∞ for all = 1, 2, · · · , L. We then have, for all m and
From (33) we see that the pay-off of user-m is completely decoupled from p −m , the pay-off of other users. As a result, given B, the equilibrium strategy of user-m can be simply expressed as
The following lemma is then a generalization Lemma 2. Lemma 4: For a given B we have, for all (m, )
where r m (B) = r m (β , β − ) is the solution to the equation U m (r) = 2r/ ( k β mk ).
Proof: The optimality equation for the problem in (35) is given by
It is easy to check that p B m in (36) satisfies the above conditions, thus verifying first part of the lemma. For the second part, note that k β mk = 0 implies β m = 0 for all (since β m are non-negative). Thus, the problem in (35) reduces to p B m = arg max p m (− p m ), the (non-negative) solution to which is simply given by p B m = 0 for all . Substituting for P B in (34), the link pay-off functions can be expressed as 
Substituting the above in (37) simplifies the link pay-off functions:
Thus, when the pay-offs are linear, the pay-off of link-manager depends solely on the action β = (β m : m = 1, · · · , M ) chosen by him. Thus, for B * = [β * , β * − ] to be a Nash equilibrium the following should hold:
for all = 1, 2, · · · , L.
Without loss of generality, assume that c 1 = max m {c m }. Then, the solution to the above problem is given by 
Thus, the rate allocated to user m on link-at equilibrium is given by
Further, recalling (38), the total rate allocated to user m at equilibrium can be written as
Similarly, the total rate served by the link-manager at equilibrium is given by
The foregoing establishes that a Stackelberg equilibrium exists for the game G({U m }, {V }) where the U m are linear pay-offs.
B. Bound on Efficiency for Linear User Pay-offs
As in Part I we define the efficiency of a Stackelberg equilibrium (B * , P B *
) as
where {x B * m } denotes the rates allocated at Stackelberg equilibrium while x s m are the social optimum rates (obtained by solving ML-SYSTEM in (27)).
The following result is a generalization of Theorem 4. Theorem 7: Fix a collection of link-cost functions {V (·)}. For any set of linear user pay-offs {U m }, we have
Proof: See Appendix F. In the next two subsections, we examine how low this efficiency can sink for polynomial link costs and for general link costs, under linear user pay-offs. As before, we have an optimistic result for polynomial link costs.
C. Efficiency Bound for Polynomial Link Costs
Applying Theorem 7 to polynomial link-cost functions, we obtain results analogous to those in Section V-C. For instance, suppose all the link-cost functions are quadratic, i.e., V (x) = b x 2 where b > 0 for = 1, 2, · · · , L. In this case we have, v (x) = 2b x so that v −1 (y) = y 2b . Thus, the bound on efficiency can be written as
The above bound is identical to that obtained for the single link case in Part I. Similarly, the bound on efficiency when the link costs are cubic (i.e.,
. In general, for polynomial link costs of the form V (x) = b x n (n ≥ 2) we have
which converges to 1 as n → ∞. Thus, even in the multi-link setting, the efficiency approaches 1 when link cost functions bx n are considered and n → ∞.
D. Worst-Case Bound on Efficiency for Linear User Pay-offs
Again, as in Part I, the worst-case bound on efficiency can be arbitrarily close to 0 for pathological link-cost functions. To see this, assume that V = V for all . Then, the bound on efficiency reduces to that in the single link case, i.e.,
. Now, applying the arguments in Section V-D, we can identify a sequence of link-cost functions V (n) , n ≥ 1, such that the corresponding sequence of efficiency bounds converges to 0 as n → ∞.
X. CONCLUSION
This paper was about double auction mechanisms and a proposal for a structured interaction to increase efficiency in the presence of strategic agents. The mechanism has application in data off-loading and network slicing markets. Data offloading is a good low-cost strategy that leverages existing auxiliary technology for handling the growth of mobile data. Technologies to enable such offloading are now available [2] , [3] . Network slicing is expected to open up new business opportunities for mobile operators who can slice their physical resources and lease them to tenants or virtual network operators. Since in both examples the resulting markets are resource trading markets, suitable compensation mechanisms have to be put in place to encourage trading of the physical resources. It is natural that the agents involved are strategic. This paper demonstrates that mechanisms for trading resources should be designed with some care. An earlier work proposed a data offloading mechanism (collect bids, allocate offloading amounts, and distribute payments) and designed an iterative procedure to get the system to a competitive equilibrium where all agents benefited, if all agents were price-taking. We showed that if the agents are price-anticipating, this benefit completely disappears and the efficiency loss is 100%. New mechanisms are thus needed when all agents are price-anticipating. We proposed a simple Stackelberg formulation with the supplying agent as a lead player. The resulting mechanism structures the interactions and alleviates the problem to some extent. The efficiency is lower bounded in terms of the true link cost function. The efficiency loss is 25% for quadratic link costs (efficiency = 0.75). While there are link cost functions for which the efficiency loss, even in the Stackelberg formulation, is close to 100%, these appear to be pathological cases. The proposed mechanism with link suppliers as lead players will likely have tolerable efficiency loss for most real link cost functions and arbitrary but linear user payoffs. This is to be contrasted with 100% efficiency loss for the price-anticipating mechanism. Going beyond our scalar bid per resource, our proposal also suggests an interesting open problem for implementation theorists. Does the minimum signaling dimension for social welfare maximization (in the Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept) strictly decrease?
The proof is based on Lagrangian technique. We now outline the key steps before going into the details. We first show that the optimality conditions for SYSTEM implies (C1)−(C3) that are required of a competitive equilibrium (CE); since the problem SYSTEM is convex, the existence result simply follows from the existence of a (primal and dual optimal) solution to the KKT conditions [15] , [16] . For the second part, starting with (C1)−(C3) we deduce the optimality conditions for SYSTEM; the second part of the theorem then follows since KKT conditions in our present setting are both necessary and sufficient for optimality. Details follow.
A. Proof of Existence of CE
Step-1: KKT conditions for SYSTEM
The Lagrangian for SYSTEM in (1) is given by
where, λ and µ = (µ 1 , · · · , µ m ) are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints in (1b) and (1c), respectively. Defining y = i y i , the optimality conditions are given by
along with primal feasibility ((1b)−(1d)), dual feasibility (i.e., λ ≥ 0, µ m ≥ 0 ∀m) and complementary slackness conditions:
Step-2: Identifying a candidate competitive-equilibrium Since the problem is convex there exist primal and dual optimal points, (x s , y s ) and (λ s , µ s ), respectively, that together satisfy the above KKT conditions. Define p s and β s as 
In the following we will show that (p s , β s , λ s , µ s ) is a competitive equilibrium, i.e., we verify (C1)−(C3).
Step-3: Verifying (C1) and (C2)
To verify (C1), we need to show that p s m is optimal for the problem of maximizing P m (p m ; µ . If the former is true then (54) holds trivially, while in the latter case (54) follows from the second part of (48). Thus, condition (C2) is verified.
Step-4: Verifying (C3)
To verify (C3-a) we need to prove that x s = y s . Evidently, since the objective in (1a) is strictly increasing in x m (owing to the strictly-increasing condition imposed on U m ), at optimality it should be that x s = y s . For completeness, we formally prove this result using the optimality conditions. Suppose 0 ≤ 
The last equality is obtained by noting that p Note that, unlike in (56), the summation in the final term above is restricted to m ∈ M s . This is because, in this case whenever µ Using this in (57) and simplifying for λ s we obtain
Note that, since λ s > 0, we have C s > C in this case.
Results from the above two conditions can be compactly expressed as (7) and (8); thus (C3-b) and (C3-c) are verified.
Thus, unilateral deviation from p o m is not beneficial for user m (∀m). Similarly, for any β such that β m > 0 for some m, we have
To obtain the above, note that since the users' payments are zero, from (13), the first expression applies. Any other value of β m does not strictly increase the pay-off of the link-supplier. Thus, (p o , β o ) is a Nash equilibrium. We now prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Let (p * , β * ) be a Nash equilibrium. Suppose p Thus, for each the optimal rate allocation x (c) ) .
The worst case bound on efficiency can be obtained by taking infimum over all c > 0.
